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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

DANNY L. PIERCE,

:

Case No. 880346-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of presenting a false
or fraudulent insurance claim in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-521 (1978), following a trial in Fourth District Court, in
and for Utah County, State of Utah, Boyd L. Park, Judge,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-3526(2)(a) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the information was sufficient to meet the

requirements of Utah law and need not have plead specific facts
to establish that the prosecution was within the statute of
limitations.
2.

Whether the issue concerning the statute of

limitations was a question of law to be determined by the trial
court or a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
3.

Whether the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense, which requires the defendant to come forward
with some evidence to support his claim that the statute has run.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Danny L. Pierce, was charged with presenting
a false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978).
Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury in Fourth
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, on February 24,
1988.

He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an

indeterminate term of one to fifteen years.

Execution of the

sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for
18 months.

The terms of probation included, inter alia, that he

pay restitution in the amount of $ 6,450, that he pay a fine in
the amount of $750 or complete 150 hours of community service,
that he pay $187 to the victim's reparation fund, and that he
serve 30 days in the Utah County jail.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Prior to July 14, 1981, defendant made an appointment
with Darwin Cottle, an independent insurance agent, to discuss
obtaining insurance for his 1977 four-wheel drive Chevrolet
pickup truck (R. 267). Defendant and Mr. Cottle met once, and
then on July 14, 1981, defendant returned for a second meeting
(R. 269). Defendant emphasized that the vehicle was of great
value to him, that he took good care of it, and he wanted to make
sure it was insured for at least $8,000 (R. 268-69).

On July 14,

at defendant's request, Mr. Cottle filled out an application for
insurance and issued a binder (R. 270). The insurance coverage
took effect the same day (R. 273).
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On July 19, 1981, only five days later, defendant
contacted Mr. Cottle to inform him that the vehicle had been
stolen (R. 278). On July 21, 1981, defendant gave Mr. Cottle
additional information over the phone and Mr. Cottle completed an
accident/loss report (R. 280).
Ned Walker, a claims adjuster, was assigned to handle
the claim (R. 292). He met with defendant and obtained his
handwritten statement (R. 297). Defendant signed the statement
in Mr. Walker's presence (R. 302). Defendant informed Mr. Walker
that Russell Hunsaker and Warren Booth had taken the truck to a
movie at University Mall in Orem and that when they got out of
the movie they discovered that the truck was missing (R. 299).
As part of his investigation, Mr. Walker discussed the matter
with Hunsaker and Booth (R. 299). Defendant was paid $8,000 for
the loss, less $100 for the deductible provision (R. 300). The
actual loss to the insurance company, after salvage of part of
the truck, was $6,450 (R. 300).
Defendant's truck had not been stolen, as he claimed.
Defendant was in financial trouble and needed money (R. 314,
325).

He contrived a plan to strip the vehicle, push it over a

cliff in Provo Canyon, and then collect the insurance money (R.
324-29).
Defendant made arrangements with Russell Hunsaker to
take the stripped truck up Provo Canyon and push it over a cliff
(R. 322-23).

Hunsaker had been a friend and employee of

defendant for a number of years, having met defendant when he was
14 (R. 311, 313). Hunsaker was working for defendant in July
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1981; defendant was frequently late in paying Hunsaker and
eventually Hunsaker left his employment (R. 314-15).

Hunsaker

and Warren Booth, who both testified at trial, along with two
other individuals, took the truck to a location in Provo Canyon,
removed the wheels and tires, and then pushed the truck over a
cliff (R. 323, 370-72).

The truck had been stripped of its seat,

windows, roll bar, stereo and other items prior to taking it up
the canyon (R. 322, 371). Hunsaker and Booth then returned to
defendant's home and, as defendant had instructed them, called
the police (R. 317-19, 368-69).

They told the investigating

officer that they had gone to a movie at University Mall and,
upon returning to the location of the truck, found that it had
been stolen (R. 317).
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss,
contending that the statute of limitations barred prosecution for
the offense (R. 14). In support of his motion, defendant called
six witnesses (R. 147, 187, 195, 203, 220, 246). He attempted to
show that authorities had discovered the offense prior to the
time Russell Hunsaker then came forward in June 1987. However,
defendant was unable to establish that the police had more than a
mere hunch or suspicion that defendant had fraudulently presented
the insurance claim.
Specifically, Bruce Wilkins, Orem Police Department,
suspected insurance fraud, in view of the policy having been in
effect less than a week, but he had no evidence that defendant
was responsible (R. 150-53).

Officer McComber took the initial

report and based on his prior association with defendant, he was
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suspicious but had no evidence (R. 190). Darren Cottle, the
insurance agent, had a "gut feeling" that something was amiss,
but had no information to establish fraud (R. 197). Ned Walker,
the insurance adjuster, had a "normal apprehension" about the
claim, but had no proof of fraud (R. 209-10).

Paul Johnson, the

Orem City Attorney, received information from defendant's wife,
Jodi Pierce, in May of 1986 that defendant had engaged in general
criminal activity, but was given no information concerning an
alleged theft in 1981 (R. 221-22).

And, finally, Charlotte

Leany, who was with Jodi Pierce when she talked to Paul Johnson,
reiterated that Mrs. Pierce had not told Johnson about the
insurance fraud (R. 248).
Defendant's involvement in the "theft" of his truck was
not discovered until June 4, 1987, when Russell Hunsaker,
defendant's friend and former employee, informed Paul Johnson,
the Orem

City Attorney, about defendant's scheme.

During a

deposition for an unrelated civil matter, Hunsaker stated that
he, Warren Booth, and others took the stripped vehicle to Provo
Canyon and "dumped" it at the request of defendant.

Warren

Booth's deposition was taken on August 5, 1987, and he reiterated
the statements of Hunsaker (R. 32-34;

see also R. 167, 172-73,

182).
Following the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss,
the trial court denied the motion (R. 251). Following the trial,

This evidence was not elicited during the hearing on the
pretrial motion, but was put before the trial court in the
State's response to defendant's motion to dismiss, which was
signed by the deputy county attorney (R. 32-38).
-5-

defendant was convicted as charged of presenting a false or
fraudulent insurance claim (R. 84).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The information charging defendant with presenting a
false or fraudulent insurance claim need not have plead facts
that would establish that the statute of limitations had not run.
Under Utah law, an information can be an extremely summary
statement of the charge.

It need not allege such things as time

and may or may not contain a probable cause statement.

So long

as the information provides defendant with notice of the charge,
it is legally sufficient.

In any event, the information charged

defendant with -fraud," which would have put him on notice that
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) would be applicable, which
makes the statute of limitations for crimes involving fraud a
potential seven years so long as the prosecution is commenced
within one year of discovery of the offense.
Whether the statute of limitations had expired was a
question of law for the trial court; as such, defendant's
requested jury instructions on this issue were properly denied.
The State of Utah had the burden of proving each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; the burden of
proof was not improperly shifted to defendant.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E PROSECUTION N E E D NOT PLEAD FACTS IN T H E
INFORMATION T O ESTABLISH THAT T H E CRIME W A S
COMMITTED WITHIN T H E STATUTE O F L I M I T A T I O N S .
Defendant w a s charged w i t h presenting a false or
fraudulent insurance claim, which w a s a second d e g r e e felony
b e c a u s e of the $8,000 value of the claim

A prosecution for a

felony must generally be commenced within four years of the
completion of the offense.
(S upp. 1987).

Utah Code Ann, § 7 6-1-302(1)(a)

H owe\ e i: , wh e i I a ma t e i: i a 1! e 1 erne n t o £ t h e offense

includes fraud, t h e prosecution c a n be commenced w i t h i n o n e y e a r
after t h e "discovery of t h e offense" so long a s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n
i s i lot exterided moire thai i tl u: ee year s beyond t h e usua] four year
period.

Utah Code A n n . § 76-l-303(a) (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) .

In t h e

present case, defendant committed t h e crime on or about July 1 9 ,
1981 (R

2761).

T h e offense w a s n o t discovered until defendant's

a c c o m p l i c e , R u s s e l l H u n s a k e r , came forward w i t h information about
the crime in J u n e 1987 (R. 3 2 - 3 4 ) .

T h e information

commencing

the action w a s filed on November 19, 1 9 8 7 (R 1 0 ) , w h i c h tolled
the running of t h e statute of limitations.
P.2d 109/ 110 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) .

State v . Strand, 674

Because the proserutioTi wa?- commenced

w i t h i n o n e y e a r after discovery of t h e o f f e n s e , t h e usual four
y e a r statute w a s extended t o seven y e a r s .
D e f e n d a n t argues that the infoimation waw detective in
that it fai ] ed t o plead specific facts tc: » establish that t h e
statute of limitations d i d n o t b a r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e
offense.

In si ippox t of thi s argumentil( d e £ e n d a n t ci tes In r e

-7-

Demillo, 121 Cal.Rptr. 725, 14 Cal.3d. 598, 535 P.2d 1181 (1975).
However, as set-forth below, this 13-year-old California case is
not in accord with Utah law.
Utah has adopted a form of notice pleading.

The

requirements for an information are contained in Utah R. Crim. P.
4(b), which states:
An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by
stating in concise terms the definition of
the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause
to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as time, place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership
need not be alleged unless necessary to
charge the offense. Such things as money,
securities, written instruments, pictures,
statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are
generally known or by which they may be
identified without setting forth a copy.
However, details concerning such things may
be obtained through a bill of particulars.
Neither presumptions of law nor matters of
judicial notice need be stated.
The purpose of an information is to charge an offense
and sufficiently apprise a defendant of the particulars of the
charge to enable the defendant to "adequately prepare his
defense."

State v. Fultonf 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987),

cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 777 (1988), citing, State v. Burnett,
712 P.2d 260, 266 (Utah 1985); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321,
326 (Utah 1983).

As the Supreme Court also noted in Fulton, the

contents of an information may be an extremely summairy statement
of the charge.

Id.

Neither Rule 4(b) nor Utah caselaw requires

-8-

that an information plead specific facts to establish that the
crime was. irummenced within the applicable statute of limitations.
Defendant's reliance on In re Demillo is not
persuasive.

In DeMillo, the information failed

plead facts to

show the defendant'* absence from the St.ate anc • - *- consequent
application of the California Penal Code section which would have
tolled the statute of limitations.

Utah has a similar statute,

Utah Code Ann

However, the tolling of the

§ 7 6 1 -304 (J 978)

statute of limitations is not the issue In the present case; the
issue is not whether specific facts (e.g., the absence of
defendant from the state) caused an exception to, or tolled, the
statute of limitations

in the present case, there is a specific

statute which governs the period of time within which a
prosecution for frau il may be commenced.

Utah Code Ann. § 76 1

303 (Supp. 1987) is applicable in the present case and states
that when an offense involves, inter alia, fi: and, the st .atute of
limitations is seven years so long as the prosecution is
commenced within one year of the discovery of the offense.
in the instant casf\r unlike Demillo,, the information is
not facially defective, and defendant was put on notice at that
outset that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) would be
applicable.

The very nature and ti tie of the chai ge, "presenting

a false or fraudulent insurance claim/" notified defendant that a
primary aspect of the crime is fraud.
was informed

Consequently, defendant

the potent i a! applicati oi i of "Utah Code A nn. § 76-

1-303 (Supp. 1987), which would render the statute of limitations
a potential seven years.

-9 •

Further, if defendant had concerns about the
sufficiency of the information, his exclusive remedy was to file
a motion for bill of particulars as provided for in Utah R. Crim.
P. 4(b) and (e). In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a "defendant normally
obtains the information necessary to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of the right to adequate notice through the
operations of a bill of particulars" (citations omitted).
Failure to file a motion for bill of particulars precludes
consideration of the adequacy of the information on appeal.

Id.

Because neither Utah case law nor the Rules of Criminal
Procedure require a defendant to plead specific facts to
establish fraud, and because, in any event, the information in
this case informed defendant of the allegation of fraud and
thereby notified defendant of the applicable seven-year statute
of limitations, defendant's contention is without merit.
POINT II
WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN IS
A QUESTION OF LAW TO BE DETERMINED BY THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS
ISSUE.
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he
requested dismissal of the case on the grounds that the statute
of limitations had expired (R. 14). A pretrial hearing was held
during which defendant called six witnesses in an attempt to show
that the offense of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance
claim had been -discovered" within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) soon after the offense, or that more than

-10-

one year lapsed between discovery and the filing of the
informati on , and that the per i od of ,1 imu tat I ons had rui 1.
Following presentation of the evidence, the trial court denied
the motion (R. 251
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in
ruling as a matter of law that the prosecution was commenced
within statute of limitations.
expressed concern

OVPJ

Although defense counsel

whirh party bote

the burden nf proof at

the pretrial hearing |R, 14!)), the record does not reflect that
defendant adequately preserved this issue for appeal by
specifica. ,

/. -

. i.

s rulina on the basis

that the issue was a question of fact to be determined by the
jury.

Consequently, defendant has waived appellate review on

this issue.

State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982);

State v. Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah 1980).
In the event this Court reaches the merits ^f
defendant's claim, it should find defendant's contention to be
without merit.

The statute of limitations in a criminal case is

jurisdictional; if the statute of Iinutations has tun, the State
is barred from commencing an action.

State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz,

App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 (Ariz. App. 1972).
jurisdictional, th««

IBBHP

Because the issue is

ih a matte? of law that must bv

determined by the trial court.

See State v. Aquilar, 736 P.2d

620 (Or. App. 1987).
An, Bt.dteiJ in Point 1, thf; applicable statute ol
limitations in this case provided that the action could be
commenced within one year after discovery of the crime so long as

-11 -

discovery and the commencement of the action were within seven
years of the commission of the crime.

On June 4, 1987, Russell

Hunsaker reported the crime to Paul Johnson, the Orem City
Attorney, during his deposition on an unrelated civil matter.
Warren Booth also gave information about the crime on August 5,
1987.

(R. 32-34)

The information was filed on November 19,

1987, charging defendant with presenting a false or fraudulent
insurance claim (R. 10). Thus, the information was filed within
one year of the discovery of the crime and within seven years of
the crime itself.
Defendant alleges that a number of important factual
questions exist which should have been determined by a jury.
10-11.

AB

He contends that whether defendant was having financial

difficulty, whether defendant had the insurance for only five
days, whether the car was stripped in one place and then
transported, and whether the fact that the police requested
defendant to take a polygraph constituted discovery of the crime
were facts that should have been decided by the jury.
baseless argument.

This is a

Unlike State v. Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426 P.2d

26 (1967) and State v. Ladely, 82 Wash.2d 172, 509 P.2d 658
(1973), relied upon by defendant, there are no disputed facts in
this case.

The prosecution acknowledges that they were

suspicious of defendant from the outset.

However, mere suspicion

does not constitute discovery which would invoke the running of
the statute of limitations for fraud.
It is apparent that none of defendant's "factual
questions" goes beyond the realm of "suspicion."

-12-

Suspicion is

defined in HI at k B Law Dictionary as ' '[t]he apprehensioi i of
something without proof or upon slight evidence.

Suspicion

implies a belief or opinion based upon facts or circumstances
which do not amount of proof "" Black s I »aw Dictionary 129 8 ( 5th
ed. 1979).

This principle was reaffirmed in Turner v. Liner, 87

P.2d 74 0, 742 (Cal. 1939), in which the California Supreme Court
stated that

di scover y "" and " know 1 edge" are

terms, and whether there has been a discovery

'

• i ver 111 1 e

• the facts

constituting a fraud, within the meaning of the statute of
limitations, is a question of law to be determined bv the court.
In the present case, the determination of whether the
statute of limitations had run was a question of law to be
determined i: y the trial court.

Even though the issue involved

mixed questions of law and fact, the decision was a preliminary
determination to be made by the court.
P.2d 113 6 (Or. App. 1979).

See State v. Hawk, 589

This issue is analogous to an

affirmative defense, such as a contention that evidence was
seized illegally

The trial court must deter mi ne based oi :t facts

presented at a hearing on a motion to suppress whether, as a
matter of law, the evidence should be suppressed.

See State v.

Hinton, 680 P.2d 74 9 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988).

Simply because

there are issues of witness credibility or sufficiency of the
e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t c o n v e i: t a q u e s t i o n o £ I a w i n t o a q u e s t i • ::> n o f

fact for a jury determination.
In the present case, because the trial court properly
ru 1 ed that 11 ie statute of 1 i ini tat i o n B h a d n o t r un, defendant was

-] 3-

not entitled to his requested jury instructions on this issue, as
he contends.
POINT III
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED TO DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE.
Although there is no Utah law on point on this issue,
it appears that defendant's contention that the statute of
limitations had run is similar to an affirmative defense.

As a

result, defendant must have come forward with some evidence,
however slight, that the statute had run.
However, at no time was the burden of proof
unconstitutionally shifted to defendant in this case.

In cases

in which a defendant raises an affirmative defense, all he must
do is show some evidence to raise a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the prosecution always bears the burden of proving
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Starks,

627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981).
In the present case, defendant presented evidence in an
attempt to show that the statute of limitations had run because
the State had "discovered" the offense well before Russell
Hunsaker came forward with his statement to authorities in June
of 1987.

However, the witnesses testified that while they were

suspicious of defendant and had even asked him to take a
polygraph, their suspicions did not rise to the level of
discovery of the crime.
The evidence of defendant's guilt in this case was
overwhelming.

Five days prior to presenting his insurance claim,

-14-

defendant obtained a policy of insurance on his vehicle for at
least $8,000

H e e n l i s t e d ttif help" of h i s e m p l o y e e and f r i e n d ,

Russell Hunsaker (ae well as others) to take the stripped vehicle
to Provo Canyon, remove t h e tires and w h e e l s , and push t h e
veh i c 1 e o i e :i a c .11 f f . N t > i o n I, y d i d R u s s e 11 H u n s a k e r t e s t i f j • a t
trial t o these e v e n t s , Warren Booth did a s w e l l .

T h e prosecution

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as t h e jury found, that
defendant had committed the cr ime

At i 10 time was t h e burden of

proof impermissibly shifted t o defendant.
CONCLUSION
Defendai it

Danny L. Pierce, w a s properly convicted of

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim within t h e
applicable statute of limitations.

For t h e foregoi ng r e a s o n s ,

the State requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this QJ

d a y of December,

1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

riMyMI BARBARA BEARNS0N
Assistant Attorney General
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